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HIS Article addresses substantive criminal law. It compiles particu-
larly important decisions from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
issued since last year's Annual Survey that will have a pervasive im-
pact on criminal cases in Texas. The cases cited and discussed in this article
were selected because they are significant to the trial of criminal cases in
Texas, because they provide an excellent recapitulation of established legal
principles, or because they reaffirm established case law that had come into
question or fallen into disuse. The cases are set out by topic in the general
order in which they occur in the evolution of a criminal case.
I. PRETRIAL AREAS
In the pretrial area, cases from the court of criminal appeals addressed
several search and seizure issues, including the status in Texas of the pretext
arrest and the inevitable arrest doctrines, the difference between an arrest
and an investigative detention, and the limits on searches of public school
students. The court also decided several cases regarding the amendment of
informations and indictments, addressing the issues of whether a name
change in an indictment is an amendment, what types of amendments are
improper because they charge different offenses or prejudice a defendant's
substantial rights, the proper procedures for amending an indictment, and
whether improper amendments will be subjected to a harm analysis on ap-
peal. Other cases decided by the court addressed the defendant's right to
choose counsel, the defendant's right to an investigator in a drug case, when
jeopardy attaches to multiple but abandoned counts in an indictment, habeas
corpus procedure, and a trial judge's power to dismiss charges.
A. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. Pretext Arrest or Search Doctrine Abandoned as a Matter of United
States Constitutional Law
Because as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, eleven of the twelve fed-
eral circuit courts' have abandoned the subjective bad faith test that is the
* Judge Chuck Miller, B.A., SMU; J.D., SMU; Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals.
** David Coale, A.B. Harvard University; J.D. candidate, University of Texas; Intern,
Court of Criminal Appeals.
1. See Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Only the Ninth
Circuit still adheres to a wholly subjective analysis. Id.
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heart of the pretext search/arrest doctrine, the court of criminal appeals also
abandoned it in Garcia v. State.2 There are two objective tests floating
among the circuits. The majority test simply asks whether there was any
objective legal reason for the stop or search. If one is present, the search will
be upheld. 3 The minority view applies a modified objective test, which is
"not whether the officer could have validly made the stop but whether under
the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the
absence of the invalid purposes."' 4 The court of criminal appeals overruled
Black v. State,5 the primary Texas pretext case, and adopted the pure objec-
tive test.6 Texas constitutional law was not raised in this case so the viability
of the doctrine under Texas law is still open. 7
2. Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Thrown Out Under Article 3&23(a) of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
The Texas statutory exclusionary rule is embodied in article 38.23(a) of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and says basically that no evidence
obtained in violation of any Texas or United States law shall be admitted in
trial.8 A four judge plurality of the court of criminal appeals construed this
article narrowly in Garcia v. State,9 stating that since the legislature did not
spell out an exception for the inevitable discovery doctrine, as it did for the
good faith exception in article 38.23(b), 10 the court would not create such an
exception. " I The plurality opinion noted that while the court has applied the
inevitable discovery doctrine many times, this case was the first in which the
defendant argued that the doctrine was a creation of the United States
Supreme Court.1 2 Since states can enlarge, but not shrink, a defendant's
rights from their interpretation by the Supreme Court, the plurality held
that Texas statutory law precludes the application of the doctrine in Texas
state courts. 13 Two judges concurred in the result by applying the inevitable
discovery doctrine and holding that the State had not met its burden of prov-
2. Id. at 942.
3. Seven circuit courts have indicated that an entirely objective evaluation must be ac-
corded the facts. Id. at 942. The Fifth Circuit is among them. See United States v. Causey,
834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
4. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 942 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11 th
Cir. 1986)). Three circuits have adopted this test.
5. 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
6. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 944.
7. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 & n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding
that the Texas Constitution can protect rights more expansively than the United States
Constitution).
8. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
9. 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
10. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
11. Garcia, 829 S.W.2d at 799-800.
12. Id. at 797 n.18, 798.
13. Id. at 799-800. The plurality opinion was joined by one judge who wrote separately to




ing it up in this case.14 Another judge concurred without giving a reason,'5
and two judges dissented.' 6
3. Arrest vs. Investigative Detention: Probable Cause and Radio Dispatches
Amores v. State17 is a good recapitulation of prior law distinguishing an
arrest from an investigative detention. The difference can be crucial because
an investigative detention' requires "a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the person detained is connected with criminal activity," whereas an
arrest requires probable cause to believe a crime is being or has been com-
mitted by the arrestee. 19 "An arrest occurs when a person's liberty of move-
ment is restricted or restrained."' 20 The Amores court concluded that the
defendant was arrested under the United States Constitution,2' as well as
under article 15.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,22 noting that
he was on the ground with guns pointed at him.23 The court found that the
officer's characterization of this as an investigative detention was not deter-
minative, and cited six cases as examples of just when an arrest occurs. 24
Turning to whether there was probable cause to arrest for burglary, the
court noted that although the officer relied on a radio dispatch reporting a
burglary in progress, because the prosecutor had not called the dispatcher to
testify, no probable cause for the content of the broadcast was in evidence. 25
Standing alone, a police broadcast does not sufficiently establish probable
cause for an arrest. 26 Additional facts must be available to the officer, or to
the dispatcher, which would warrant a reasonable person to conclude that a
crime had been or was being committed by the arrestee.27 The facts may be
known only to the dispatcher. In this situation, the officer can rely on the
dispatcher's broadcast conclusion, here that a burglary by a man fitting the
defendant's description and location was in progress, in making the arrest. 28
But when that arrest is challenged in court, the facts relied on by the dis-
patcher have to be testified to by the dispatcher or they will not be factored
into the probable cause determination. 29
14. Id. at 803 (Miller and Campbell, JJ., concurring).
15. Id. at 800 (McCormick, P.J., concurring).
16. Id. at 800 (White and Baird, JJ., dissenting).
17. 816 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
18. An investigative detention is often called a Terry stop, after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
19. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 411.
20. Id. (citing Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
21. U.S. CONST. amends. IV & XIV.
22. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.22 (Vernon 1977) (defining when a person is
arrested).
23. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 412.
24. Id. at 412 & n.7.
25. Id. at 414-15. These two pages of A mores provide some excellent examples of when
the dispatcher needs to testify.
26. Id. at 416.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 416-17.
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4. School Search Parameters Spelled Out
Because students enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, school author-
ities are regulated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 The test for a school
search is not probable cause to believe that the subject of the search is violat-
ing the law. Instead, the legality of a search of a public school student de-
pends on the reasonableness of the search under all the circumstances. 3 1
Reasonableness is determined using a two-pronged test. First, the search
must be justified at its inception, meaning that the official must have reason-
able grounds for suspecting that the search will reveal evidence that the stu-
dent has violated, or is violating, the law or rules of the school. 32 Second,
the search must be related in scope, which requires that the measures used
reasonably relate to the objectives of the search and that they are not exces-
sively intrusive. 33 In Coronado v. State34 school officials reasonably sus-
pected the student skipped school, so prong one was met.35 He was patted
down for safety reasons, which was a reasonable, minimally intrusive search.
Then, however, his locker and car were searched. These searches were not
reasonably related in scope to the question of whether he was skipping
school which had justified the initial confrontation. 36 Thus, the trial court
should have suppressed the cocaine seized from the student's car.3 7
B. AMENDMENT OF INFORMATIONS AND INDICTMENTS
1. Amending to Reflect a Defendant's True Name Is Not an Amendment
Article 26.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure says that if, at
arraignment, a defendant suggests that his name is other than that in the
indictment, the indictment is to be corrected to reflect the defendant's true
name.38 In Kelley v. State39 the defendant made such a suggestion and the
indictment was corrected. The defendant then maintained that this change
was an amendment as contemplated by article 28.10 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure,4° which entitled him to an automatic ten day continu-
ance. The court of criminal appeals rejected the defendant's argument and
held that an article 26.08 name change simply is not an amendment as con-
templated by article 28.10.41
30. See Coronado v. State, 835 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing New




34. 835 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. June 24, 1992).
35. Id. at 641.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.08 (Vernon 1989).
39. 823 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
40. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1989) (amendment of indictment
or information).
41. Kelley, 823 S.W.2d at 302.
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2. Amending Indictments Under Article 28.10 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure
Article 28.10(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the
amendment of an indictment as to form or substance over the defendant's
objection if the amended indictment charges a "different offense" or
prejudices the "substantial rights" of the defendant. 42 In Flowers v. State43
the court of criminal appeals determined that "different offense" means a
different statutory offense. 44 Thus, when the theft indictment in that case
was amended to add the name of the owner, adding an element of theft
omitted from the original indictment, or at least changing an element, the
amended indictment did not charge a different offense from the original
one.
4 5
Concerning whether this change prejudiced the "substantial rights" of the
defendant, the court went into great detail to lay the groundwork for a
proper analysis. It analogized this inquiry to that concerning "substantial
rights" in Adams v. State,46 which held that all of the trial should be looked
at retrospectively to determine if any substantial right was prejudiced, with
the focus of prejudice being from the standpoint of the particular right
claimed to have been prejudiced. 47 Accordingly, since the change or addi-
tion of the name of the owner did not result in a different occurrence or
incident being charged, the "substantial rights" of the defendant were not
affected. 48 The court, however, did not adopt a blanket rule that as long as
the change did not charge a different occurrence or incident substantial
rights would not be prejudiced. Rather, it held that in most cases this result
would be true after a review of the record for prejudice. 49
3. Bright Line Rule for When and How an Indictment Is Amended
Ward v. State5° creates a "bright line rule" for amending indictments and
informations under articles 28.10 and 28.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. 5' Basically, the correct procedure is that the prosecutor makes a
motion to the trial court that the indictment be amended to reflect the neces-
sary changes, the judge grants the motion, and then the indictment is physi-
cally altered to reflect the changes. 52 It is not enough to make the motion
and have it granted, even if the order granting the motion includes words
like "the indictment is hereby amended." There is no amendment to an in-
dictment or information until there is a physical alteration such as handwrit-
42. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c) (Vernon 1989).
43. 815 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 728.
45. Id. at 729.
46. 707 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
47. Flowers, 815 S.W.2d at 729 (describing and applying the reasoning of Adams v. State).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 829 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
51. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 28.10, 28.11 (Vernon 1989).
52. Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 793.
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ing on it, typing on it, interlining, or striking out words. 53
The court applied the same rule to a different fact situation in Rent v.
State.54 In Rent, the motion was made and granted well before trial, but the
physical amendment was not done until the day of trial. The defendant re-
quested his ten day continuance under article 28.10(a) but the trial judge
denied the request because the prosecutor's motion to amend had been
granted more than ten days before trial. The court of criminal appeals held
that the ten days ran from the day the indictment was physically amended,
and, therefore, the ten day continuance should have been granted. 55 Since
the harmless error rule does not apply to the denial of a 28.10(a) continu-
ance according to Sodipo v. State,56 the court affirmed the court of appeals'
decision to reverse the conviction. 57
4. Violation of Article 28.10 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Is
Reversible Error
Article 28.10 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure covers amend-
ments to indictments before and during trial.5 8 Brown v. State59 held that
any violation of the article, be it an amendment on the day of or during trial
which is objected to by the defendant, an amendment before the day of trial
alleging an additional or different offense objected to by the defendant, or a
continuance requested and denied when required, is not subject to a harm
analysis. 6° Therefore, such a violation mandates reversal of the conviction. 6t
C. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE COUNSEL UNDER ARTICLE 1.051
OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In Burgess v. State62 the defendant represented himself at trial and lost.
On appeal he complained that he had not knowingly and intentionally
waived his right to counsel, and also that he had not signed the written
waiver of counsel required by article 1.051 (g) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.63 As to the latter, the court of criminal appeals held that the
statute is permissive and not mandatory, notwithstanding its seemingly
mandatory language. 64 Thus, a defendant may validly waive his right to
53. Id. at 793 & n.14.
54. 838 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (opinion on state's motion for rehearing).
55. Id. at 551.
56. 815 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (opinion on state's motion for
rehearing).
57. Rent, 838 S.W.2d at 551.
58. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1989).
59. 828 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
60. Id. at 764.
61. Id.
62. 816 S.W.2d. 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
63. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Article 1.051(g)
states that "the court shall provide the defendant with a statement ... which, if signed by the
defendant shall be filed with and become part of the record" if the waiver is intelligently and
voluntarily made.
64. Burgess, 816 S.W.2d at 430.
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counsel, refuse to sign the form, and still be entitled to proceed pro se.6 5
As to the former complaint, the court began by noting that the defendant
wanted his court-appointed attorney fired and a new attorney appointed just
before trial. The court stated that a trial judge confronted with an eleventh
hour request for change of counsel has essentially three options. First, the
trial judge can give the defendant new counsel. 66 Second, if the judge denies
new counsel and the accused unequivocally asserts his right to self-represen-
tation after proper admonishment, the judge must let the accused represent
himself.67 Third, if the judge denies new counsel and the accused does not
assert his right to self-representation, the judge must compel the accused to
proceed to trial with the lawyer he has, whether he wants to or not.68 In
Burgess, the trial judge refused to appoint new counsel, leaving the defend-
ant with the choice of proceeding with an attorney he did not want or pro-
ceeding pro se. The court found nothing unfair about forcing the defendant
to make that choice, if the trial judge thought that the defendant did so
informedly and with eyes open. 69
D. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN INVESTIGATOR/CHEMIST
IN A DRUG CASE
In McBride v. State70 the defense to a charge of drug possession was that
the drugs were planted on the defendant by enemy drug dealers. The de-
fendant sought an independent qualitative inspection by a chemist hoping to
show that the drugs were cut heavily, under the theory that the dealers did
not want to waste good stuff in planting the drugs. The court of criminal
appeals held that a defendant has an absolute right to inspection of evidence
"indispensable to the State's case."' 71 An item is indispensable if its exclu-
sion from evidence would affect the essential proof that the defendant com-
mitted the offense. 72 For example, the drugs in a drug case are
indispensable, but a tape recorded confession is not necessarily indispensa-
ble.73 In the case of drugs, inspection means inspection by an expert. 74 Be-
cause a non-indigent defendant has this right of inspection by an expert, due
process and the right to effective assistance of counsel compel the appoint-
ment of a qualified chemist to inspect the drug named in the indictment, at
no cost to the defendant. 75 This right attaches when the case is "reasonably
certain to proceed to trial."'76 The harmless error rule, however, may apply
65. Id.
66. Id. at 428.
67. Id. at 428-29.
68. Id. at 429.
69. Id.
70. 838 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
71. Id. at 251.
72. Id. (quoting Quinones v. State, 592 S.W.2d 933, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
73. Id. (quoting Quinones, 592 S.W.2d at 940).
74. Id. at 250-52.
75. Id. at 251-52.
76. Id. at 252.
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to a denial of a request for inspection. 77
E. JEOPARDY: WHEN IT ATTACHES TO MULTIPLE BUT ABANDONED
COUNTS IN AN INDICTMENT
The defendant in Ex parte Preston7 8 was indicted under a three count in-
dictment alleging three different offenses. The State abandoned two counts
and went to trial on the third and won. It then re-indicted the defendant for
the two abandoned counts, at which time the defendant claimed that jeop-
ardy attached and barred the prosecution. The court of criminal appeals
first reiterated the rules for when jeopardy attaches to an indictment. In a
jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn, and in a
bench trial jeopardy attaches when both sides have announced they are
ready and the defendant has pled to the charging instrument. 79 The court
then held that the State must take some affirmative action on the record to
dismiss, waive, or abandon ° the portion of the charging instrument on
which they do not want to prosecute and get permission from the judge to
do so before jeopardy attaches.8 ' In this case the State read only one of
three counts to the jury and the defendant entered his plea to that count
alone. The State, however, did nothing else to abandon, waive, or dismiss
the other two counts. Because jeopardy attached as soon as the jury was
impaneled and sworn, before the indictment was presented to them, jeopardy
attached to all three counts and the defendant could not therefore be tried
again on the last two counts.8 2
F. HABEAS CORPUS: NON-ARTICLE 11.07, CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, WRIT PROCEDURE EXPLAINED:
RECAPITULATION CASE
In Ex parte Hargett83 the applicant was suffering collateral legal conse-
quences from a prior conviction because the conviction was impairing his
military retirement benefits. Calling this impairment a "restraint," 84 the ap-
plicant filed a writ of habeas corpus. Article 11.01 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that a writ of habeas corpus is the remedy
when someone is "restrained."185 A judge can then issue an order requiring
an individual to come before that judge and explain the restraint.8 6 If the
77. Id. The court remanded the case and instructed the court of appeals to determine if
the harmless error rule applied. Id.
78. 833 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
79. Id. at 518 (citing Exparte Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)).
80. In practice, these terms are interchangeable. See id. at 517 n.l.
81. Id. at 518.
82. Id.
83. 819 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
84. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.22 (Vernon 1977) (defining restraint as
"the kind of control which one person exercises over another, not to confine him within certain
limits, but to subject him to the general authority and power of the person claiming such
right").




court issues the writ, the validity of the conviction comes into question and
relief is granted if the conviction must be set aside.8 7 Constitutional author-
ity for the writ comes from article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, 8
and statutory authority is found in articles 11.05, 11.08, and 11.09 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.8 9
Ex parte Hargett outlines the procedure for obtaining a writ. First, a peti-
tion for a writ is filed with a court. Then the court decides, either with or
without a hearing, whether or not to issue the writ. If the decision is not to
issue the writ, there is no appeal from this decision, but the applicant is free
to go to another court and start over or to seek a writ of mandamus.90 If the
writ is issued and, thus, the court rules on the merits of the claim, either with
or without a hearing, the applicant can appeal that decision to the court of
appeals if relief is denied. 9'
Where, as in Ex parte Hargett, the procedure is blurred, the appellate
court should look at what was done and decide whether appeal is allowa-
ble.92 Here the court fused the procedure so much that after the petition was
filed, there was only one hearing. The appellate court examined the case and
held that it was a hearing reaching the merits of the claim and not just decid-
ing whether to issue the writ, though the writ was never issued, and correctly
decided that the order denying the petition was appealable.93
G. DISMISSAL OF CHARGES: TRIAL JUDGE CANNOT DISMISS
In State v. Johnson94 the trial judge dismissed a DWI information because
the prosecutor did not show up for trial while the defendant was present and
ready. The defendant argued that trial courts have inherent authority to
dismiss cases. To decide this issue, the court of criminal appeals analyzed
the sources of a court's power in detail. "Generally speaking, a court's au-
thority to act is limited to those actions authorized by constitutional, statu-
tory, or common law." 95 The core of this power is the Texas Constitution
and involves the authority to hear evidence, decide issues of fact raised by
the pleadings, decide relevant questions of law, enter final judgments on the
facts and the law, and execute final judgments or sentences. 96 In addition, a
court has inherent authority to take certain actions, especially to aid in the
87. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1993).
88. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (granting district courts plenary power including the power
to grant writs of habeas corpus).
89. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 11.05, 11.07-.08 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1993).
The statutory writ is available only when the applicant is in custody. Ex parte Hargett, 819
S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The writ filed under article V, section 8 of the Texas
Constitution, however, is available when the applicant is suffering collateral legal consequences
but is not in custody. Id.
90. Hargett, 819 S.W.2d at 868.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 869.
93. Id.
94. 821 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
95. Id. at 612 & n.2 (citing Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1969)).




exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, or in the preserva-
tion of its independence and integrity. 97 There appears to be no other source
of judicial power. In Johnson the court found no express constitutional or
statutory authority to dismiss an information under these circumstances and
found that case law from 1930 held that the common law was against such a
notion. 98 Further, the court believed that there was no inherent authority
for such a dismissal because it does not aid the courts in the performance of
judicial functions or the protection of their dignity, independence, and integ-
rity.9 9 The court of criminal appeals therefore held that the trial court did
not have the power to dismiss the DWI information.' °
II. TRIAL AREAS
The court of criminal appeals decided several cases involving jury selec-
tion, including issues of voir dire time limits, proper voir dire questions, the
procedure for Batson challenges, and a trial judge's power to excuse a
venireperson sua sponte. The court also clarified what part of the charge
sets the standard for determining the sufficiency of evidence, decided when
an instruction must be given on a lesser included offense, and found that the
current parole law instruction is constitutional. In the area of evidence law,
the court examined the admissibility of DNA evidence, photographs, a wit-
ness's earlier grand jury testimony, expert testimony about a defendant's
suitability for probation, and conditionally relevant evidence. The court also
examined the definition of a deadly weapon and the effect of possessing a
deadly weapon on the availability of probation.
A. JURY SELECTION
1. Voir Dire: Thirty Minute Time Limit Was Reversible Error
The right of the defendant to question prospective jurors in order to intel-
ligently and effectively exercise challenges won out over the trial judge's
right to impose reasonable time limits on voir dire in McCarter v. State. ' 0'
In that case, the judge imposed a thirty minute time limit on the defense
attorney's general questioning of the panel and did not grant the attorney
more time when the thirty minutes expired. The court of criminal appeals
reviewed the record and found that the attorney did not attempt to prolong
the voir dire by asking repetitious questions or dwelling on one area of ques-
tioning. 10 2 The court also determined that both the questions the attorney
asked and those he was precluded from asking were proper questions, mean-
ing that their purpose was to discover a juror's views on issues applicable to
the case. ' 0 3 Therefore, the trial judge abused his discretion in setting a thirty
97. Id. at 612 & n.3.
98. Id. at 612-13 (citing State v. Anderson, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174 (Crim. 1930)).
99. Id. at 613.
100. Id.
101. 837 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
102. Id. at 120-21.
103. Id. at 121-22.
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minute time limit and such an error is not subject to the harmless error
rule. °4 Note that counsel may not be precluded from asking questions sim-
ply because they are repetitious of questions asked by the D.A. or the
judge. 105 Each party must be allowed to question potential jurors in its own
manner. 1
0 6
2. Proper Question: Juror's Views About an Undefined Term
The defendant in Woolridge v. State107 sought to discover the venireper-
sons' views on the definition of reasonable doubt 0 8 and the trial court re-
fused to let the defendant do so. The court of criminal appeals reversed the
trial court, holding that "it is improper for a trial judge to impose restric-
tions based on the mere possibility that the otherwise proper question might
lengthen the process," although the judge may disallow subsequent similar
questions in the interest of time. ° 9 The court reasoned that despite the fact
that the court will not provide a definition for a term, a prospective juror's
understanding of that term may be relevant." 0 Because the lack of a defini-
tion for a term may allow a juror's perception of that term to be skewed, the
juror's understanding can become critical to the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges."' Note that the denial of the asking of a proper question"12 is error
that is not subject to a harm analysis and, therefore, results in automatic
reversible error. '13
The court affirmed this holding in Lane v. State.14 In Lane the defense
attorney sought to ask questions about reasonable doubt after the prosecut-
ing attorney had already asked some broader questions. The court allowed
the questions, holding that Woolridge allows defense counsel to supplement
the prosecutor's questions when the inquiry is on an issue applicable to the
trial, is not repetitious, and is in proper form.' 15
3. Batson Revisited: Great Restatement of Prima Facie Case and Batson
Law
Starting with the proposition that a single strike exercised on the basis of
race offends the Constitution, Linscomb v. State" 16 deals with the prima facie
104. Id. at 122.
105. Id. at 121.
106. Id.
107. 827 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
108. The trial of this case took place before the court of criminal appeals defined reasonable
doubt in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at
906 n.4.
109. Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at 905-06.
110. Id. at 906.
111. Id.
112. A proper question is one that seeks to reveal a juror's views on an issue applicable to
the case. See Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
113. Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at 906-07 (quoting Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991)).
114. 828 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
115. Id. at 766.
116. 829 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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Batson case and its philosophical legal meaning in Texas. The court equated
a prima facie case with a situation where some explanation of the motives for
minority strikes seems clearly necessary, such as where minorities are struck
in a higher proportion than their numbers on the panel. 17 Phrases used by
the court to describe the prima facie case include: "any relevant evidence
with more than a modicum of probative value," "to incline toward a belief;"
and "inferences which have been fairly raised.1"8 In Linscomb, the prose-
cutors used forty percent of their strikes to strike a racial group that com-
prised thirteen percent of the panel. The court of appeals pointed out,
however, that two members of that minority served on the jury, and, there-
fore, the jury had a higher proportion of minority members (seventeen per-
cent) than the panel (thirteen percent). Stating that the burden of proving a
prima facie case is not onerous, the court of criminal appeals used the first
statistics to find that they alone raised a prima facie case calling for the pros-
ecution to come forward with neutral explanations. 19 Because the court of
appeals had held that no prima facia case was raised, and had therefore ruled
against the defendant's Batson claim, the case was remanded to answer the
merits of the claim. 120
4. Batson Violation Remedy: Article 35.261 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure Is Sole Remedy
Hill v. State12 1 held that article 35.261 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure 22 means that a defendant must make a Batson' 23 motion after
the jury strike lists are given to the judge, but before the judge impanels the
jury. If the motion succeeds, the only relief is that the entire array be dis-
missed, a new panel brought up, and voir dire begun all over again. 124 In
Batson the Supreme Court had suggested that another possible remedy
would be to simply disallow a racially motivated State strike and seat that
minority juror, 125 but a detailed look into the legislative history of article
35.261 showed that the legislature specifically rejected this remedy and con-
sciously chose to go with the more extreme dismissal of the entire panel.' 26
Holding that determining Batson procedure was properly a legislative func-
tion and that this article was within the legislature's power and prerogative
to enact, the court pronounced that this was the sole remedy. 127
The court went on to find that the defendant had carried his burden of
117. Id.
118. Id. at 166-67.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 168.
121. 827 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 297 (1992).
122. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon 1989). Article 35.261 states that
"[a]fter the parties have delivered their lists ... and before the court has impanelled the jury,
the defendant may request the court to dismiss the array and call a new array in the case," and
if the defendant proves discrimination, "the court shall call a new array in the case." Id.
123. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
124. Hill, 827 S.W.2d at 863-64.
125. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24.




proving that the prosecutor's explanations were pretextual. 28 The explana-
tion found to be a pretext was: "I felt like he would identify with the defend-
ant. He's black, he's male, and I didn't like the way he responded to my
questions."' 129 In a concurring opinion, four judges on the court embraced
the self-evident notion that a reason based partially on race cannot be race
neutral. 30 Although the four judge plurality did not embrace this notion
and required race to be the sole reason, it found pretext anyway.' 3' The
ninth and deciding vote took a pass by concurring in the result only.' 32
5. Batson Error: Comparative Analysis Argument Allowed for First Time
on Appeal
In its original opinion in Young v. State133 the court of criminal appeals
held that a defendant was not required to request the trial judge to consider
a comparative analysis of alleged disparate treatment of venirepersons
through the State's peremptory challenges in order to ask the appellate court
to consider such an analysis.' 34 On motion for rehearing this holding
stood.' 35 Therefore, trial judges must be alert and look for disparate treat-
ment between venirepersons of different races and consider this treatment
when deciding whether the State's peremptory challenges were racially moti-
vated. The defendant need not point out such treatment because this is evi-
dence that is already before the trial judge who witnessed the voir dire.1 36
At best, comparative analysis on appeal is an argument, not an objection or
new legal theory.' 37 The objection and legal theory upon which the appeal is
based is that the State used racially motivated strikes against certain
venirepersons. 38 In an attempt to show balance, the Young court pointed
out that several preservation of error rules historically favored the State.
For example, the State may raise standing for the first time on appeal when a
defendant alleges an illegal search and seizure.1 39 Furthermore, trial judge
rulings on the admission of evidence will be upheld on appeal even if the trial
judge's reason for doing so was clearly wrong, as long as the State can come
up with a "right" reason."4°
128. Id. at 868-70.
129. Id. at 869 (quoting Hill v. State, 787 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990)).
130. Id. at 875 (Baird, Benavides, Clinton, & Overstreet, JJ., concurring).
131. Id. at 868-70.
132. Id. at 870 (Miller, J., concurring).
133. 826 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim, App. 1991) (opinion on appellant's petition for discre-
tionary review).
134. Id. at 146.
135. Id. 152-53 (opinion denying state's motions for rehearing).
136. Id. at 150.
137. Id. at 150-51.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 151 (citing Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on
State's motion for rehearing)).
140. Id. at 151-52 (citing Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)).
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6. Sua Sponte Excusal of Venireperson May Be O.K
Butler v. State'4' involved a trial judge's sua sponte excusal of venireper-
sons and the interplay, in chapter 35 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure (Formation of the Jury), between article 35.03 (Excuses), article 35.16
(Reasons For Challenge For Cause), and article 35.19 (Absolute Disqualifi-
cation).142 Discussing established case law holding that a judge should not
sua sponte excuse a venireperson unless absolutely disqualified under article
35.19, the court of criminal appeals pointed out that these cases have never
considered article 35.03 in their analysis. 143 Under article 35.03, a judge can
excuse or postpone a juror's service for almost any reason the judge deems
sufficient since there are no enumerated bases in article 35.03 limiting the
judge. 144 The court held in Butler that a judge may sua sponte excuse a
venireperson at any time during the voir dire under article 35.03.1 45 As long
as the record is clear, as it was in this case, that the excusal is not a sua
sponte excusal under article 35.16, there is no error. 146
Note that Chapter 62 of the Texas Government Code 147 now lists qualifi-
cations for jury service in section 62.102, reasons for disqualification in a
particular case in section 62.105, exemptions for jurors eligible to serve but
who may opt out in section 62.106, and judicial excusal of jurors in section
62.110. While most of this chapter applies to civil and criminal juries, a
concurring opinion in Butler points out that section 62.110, being a general
law, has been preempted in criminal cases by article 35.03, just as section
62.112,148 dealing with excusal for religious holidays, has been preempted by
article 35.03, section 3, which also deals with excusal for religious
holidays. 149
B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1. Application Paragraph Is the Yardstick for Sufficiency of the Evidence
A trio of cases, Walker v. State,150 Jones v. State,15 1 and Biggins v.
State, 152 stands for the proposition that the part of the jury charge applying
the law to the facts, called the application paragraph, will be the sole crite-
rion for determining sufficiency of the evidence. 153 The charge as a whole
141. 830 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam).
142. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 35.03, 35.16, 35.19 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1993).
143. Butler, 830 S.W.2d at 130.
144. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.03, § 1 (Vernon 1989). Article 35.03, section 1
states that "the court shall hear and determine excuses offered ... and if the court deems the
excuse sufficient, the court shall discharge the juror ..
145. Butler, 830 S.W.2d at 130-31.
146. Id. at 131-32.
147. TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. §§ 62.102, 62.105, 62.106, 62.110 (Vernon 1988 & Supp.
1993).
148. TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 62.112 (Vernon 1989).
149. Butler, 830 S.W.2d at 132-34 (Miller, J., concurring).
150. 823 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1481
(1992).
151. 815 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (per curiam).
152. 824 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam).
153. Biggins, 824 S.W.2d at 180; Walker, 823 S.W.2d at 248; Jones, 815 S.W.2d at 670.
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will not be considered. Only if a definition or other abstract portion of the
charge is incorporated by reference into the application paragraph will it be
considered in determining sufficiency.15 4 In Biggins the abstract part of the
charge contained the law of parties but the application paragraph did not.
Since the state only proved the defendant guilty as a party, he was entitled to
an acquittal on appeal, or in a motion for a new trial. 155 The same situation
and result occurred in Jones'56 and Walker. 157
2. Lesser Included Offenses
If the evidence indicates that a defendant is guilty only of a lesser included
offense, then on request a charge on that offense must be given.158 Evidence
may indicate that a defendant is guilty only of a lesser included offense in
two ways. "First, there may be evidence which refutes or negates other evi-
dence establishing the greater offense."' 59 For example, proof in an aggra-
vated robbery case that the defendant did not have a deadly weapon would
require that a charge on robbery be given upon request. 160 "Second, a de-
fendant may be shown to be guilty only of the lesser offense if the evidence
presented is subject to different interpretations."' 6' In Saunders v. State, 62
a case involving the murder of a child, the evidence showed that the seven-
teen year old defendant, in an effort to quiet the screaming child, squeezed
the back of the baby's neck and head, fracturing the skull and causing death
fifteen days later. Because this evidence is subject to the interpretation that
he intended to kill the baby, which is murder, and is also subject to the
interpretation that he was unaware of the risk of death but should have been
aware, which is criminally negligent homicide, the charge on criminally neg-
ligent homicide should have been given.' 63
3. Parole Law Charge Is Constitutional
The parole law instruction in article 37.07, section 4 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure' 64 was held to not run afoul of sections 13, 19 or 29 of
article I of the Texas Constitution 65 in Oakley v. State.' 66 Article 37.07,
section 4 was held to be constitutional because of the constitutional amend-
ment creating article IV, section 11 (a) of the Texas Constitution that was
154. Biggins, 824 S.W.2d at 180.
155. Id.
156. 815 S.W.2d at 670-71.
157. 823 S.W.2d at 248-49.
158. Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 391-92.
161. Id. at 392.
162. 840 S.W.2d 390.
163. Id. at 392.
164. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
165. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 13 (Excessive bail or fines; cruel and unusual punishment;
remedy by due course of law), 19 (Deprivation of life, liberty, etc.; due course of law), 29
(Provisions of Bill of Rights excepted from powers of government, to forever remain inviolate).
166. 830 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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passed in 1989.167 Rose v. State,168 which declared the previous version of
article 37.07, section 4 unconstitutional, is no longer good law according to
Oakley. t69 The parole law instruction in article 37.07, section 4 was also
held to not run afoul of the due process clauses of either the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (due process) in
Muhammad v. State.170 French v. State'7' further held that the parole law
instruction may be given in cases involving offenses committed before 1989
without offending the ex post facto provisions of the Texas Constitution.172
C. SPECIFIC CRIMES AND SPECIALTY LAW
1. DNA Evidence is Admissible
In Kelly v. State,173 the first court of criminal appeals case in which the
admissibility per se of DNA identification evidence was challenged based on
reliability, the court established a two part test for trial judges to use. 174
First, the trial judge must decide if evidence is reliable.' 75 Reliability of sci-
entific evidence is generally proven by three criteria and seven factors set out
in the opinion.176 Second, if the trial judge determines that the testimony is
reliable, and thus probative and relevant, the judge "must still decide
whether the probative value of the testimony is outweighed by one or more
of the factors identified in Rule 403." 177 The Frye test, adopted by some
jurisdictions, was disavowed in favor of this test based on Rules 702 and 403
of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. 178 Under the evidence in this case,
167. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (a) (giving the legislature power to pass laws requiring or
allowing juries to be informed about the effect of good conduct time and eligibility for parole).
168. 752 S.W.2d 529, 552-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (opinion on court's own motion for
rehearing).
169. 830 S.W.2d at 110.
170. 830 S.W.2d 953, 956-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
171. 830 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
172. Id. at 608-09.
173. 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
174. Id. at 572.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 573.
[E]vidence derived from a scientific theory, to be considered reliable, must sat-
isfy three criteria in any particular case: (a) the underlying scientific theory
must be valid; (b) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the
technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. ...
Factors that could affect a trial court's determination of reliability include, but
are not limited to, the following: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific
theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community,
if such a community can be ascertained; (2) the qualifications of the expert(s)
testifying; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying
scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique;
(5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the
clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be ex-
plained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person(s) who ap-
plied the technique on the occasion in question.
Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 572.
178. Id. at 571-72. The Frye test requires that a scientific principle supporting expert testi-
mony "be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Court
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the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding by
clear and convincing evidence that the scientific principle underlying DNA
testing was valid, that the technique used was valid and properly applied
here, that the statistical analysis that led to the identification was valid and
reliable, and that the Rule 403 test was met. 179 Thus, the matchup between
the DNA in a semen stain found at the home of the deceased and the DNA
in the defendant's blood was admissible. 180 The court of criminal appeals
applied the Kelly test in Fuller v. State18' and again upheld a trial court
decision to admit DNA evidence.' 82
2. Deadly Weapon Finding Not Allowed in Weapon Possession Cases
Ex parte Petty 83 held that the finding that the defendant used or exhibited
a deadly weapon 84 may not be entered if the crime which the defendant is
convicted is possession of a firearm by a felon 185 or possession of a prohib-
ited weapon. 186 In order to merit such a finding, one must "use" a weapon
in an associated felony other than mere possession of the weapon.187
D. EVIDENCE
1. New Rules Governing Admissibility of Photographs
The rules of evidence were applied for the first time to the admissibility of
photographs in Long v. State8 8 and much older case law was overruled, 89
specifically the old rule stated in Martin v. State.19° Citing Montgomery v.
reasoned that this test, while mentioned in some earlier cases, did not survive the adoption of
the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 572 & n. 12.
179. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 574.
180. Id.
181. 827 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The Fuller court summarized the Kelly test
in this way:
[plursuant to Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, the proponent
of such evidence must prove to the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence
and outside the presence of the jury, that the proffered evidence is relevant;
whereupon such is admissible before the jury unless the trial court determines
that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed per Rule 403.
Id. at 930.
182. Id. at 930.
183. 833 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
184. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(l 1) (Vernon 1974) (defining deadly weapon).
185. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.05 (Vernon 1989) (Unlawful Possession of Firearm
by Felon).
186. Ex parte Petty, 823 S.W.2d at 145; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.06 (Vernon 1989
& Supp. 1993) (Prohibited Weapons).
187. Ex parte Petty, 833 S.W.2d at 145.
188. 823 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3042 (1992).
189. Id. at 272.
190. 475 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (on appellant's motion for rehearing) . The
rule stated as follows:
[i]f a photograph is competent, material and relevant to the issue on trial, it is
not rendered inadmissible merely because it is gruesome or might tend to arouse
the passions of the jury, unless it is offered solely to inflame the minds of the
jury. If a verbal description of the body and the scene would be admissible, a
photograph depicting the same is admissible.
Id. at 267 (footnotes omitted).
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State,19 1 the seminal case discussing admissibility of evidence under the
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, 192 and discussing Texas Rule of Criminal
Evidence 403,193 the court specifically applied the rules of evidence to photo-
graphs. 194 Borrowing from Goodwin v. State,195 the court suggested that the
Rule 403 balancing test be used considering factors such as: (1) number of
photos (whether all must come in or whether there is a redundancy that can
be deleted), (2) gruesomeness, (3) detail, (4) size of the photos, (5) whether
they are in color or in black and white, (6) whether they are close-up, and (7)
whether a body shown in the photographs is naked or clothed.196 The court
then abandoned the Martin test in favor of a straight Rule 403 balancing
test. 197 In this case, the prosecutor removed seventy-five percent of the
photos taken at the crime scene to eliminate redundancy and the photos
were gory only because the crime was gory. Therefore, the court held that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the photos. 198
2. Sufficiency: Deadly Weapon Revisited: Definition Broader Now Under
Penal Code
The factual question presented in Thomas v. State'99 was whether a
"shank" was a deadly weapon. The court of criminal appeals exhaustively
discussed the various ways that something could be a deadly weapon and did
some damage to the old deadly weapon per se case law.2°° Earlier cases had
primarily been based upon the probability that a particular instrument could
cause serious bodily injury. 20 1 Under these old pronouncements, many
short bladed knives and other instruments were not deadly weapons per
se. 20 2 The Thomas court noted that section 1.07(a)( 11) of the Texas Penal
Code now specifies the only two tests of whether something is a deadly
weapon. 20 3 Section 1.07(a)(1 1)(A) provides that a deadly weapon is "a fire-
arm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of
inflicting serious bodily injury."' 20 4 Whereas a long carving knife, designed
for the kitchen, is not a deadly weapon under Subsection (A), a short bladed
"shank" may be. 205 The other test, in section 1.07(a)( 11)(B), focuses on the
use of the instrument, stating that a deadly weapon is "anything that in the
191. 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
192. See Long, 823 S.W.2d at 271.
193. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 403.
194. Long, 823 S.W.2d at 271-72 & nn.18-20.
195. 799 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2913 (1991).
196. Long, 823 S.W.2d at 272.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 273.
199. 821 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
200. Id. at 620.
201. See Hardy v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 400, 37 S.W. 434 (1896); Miller v. State, 140 Tex.
Crim. 182, 143 S.W.2d 778 (1940).
202. See Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 618.
203. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(1 1) (Vernon 1974) (Definitions: Deadly Weapon).
204. Id. § 1.07(a)(1l)(A).
205. Bayonets, scimitars, and swords of various kinds qualify as deadly weapons under this
test. Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 620.
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manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing ... serious bodily
injury" 20 6 and, thus, while the kitchen knife could be the deadly weapon and
not the "shank. '20 7 The court reasoned that one way to show that a shank
was a deadly weapon was by simple testimony about what it was designed
for. 20 8 The term "deadly weapon per se" now refers to instruments de-
scribed in section 1.07(a)( 1l)(A),209 but there must be evidence at trial that
the instrument was a firearm or was manifestly designed, made, or adapted
for the purpose of causing serious injury.210 Most importantly, it is not nec-
essary under section 1.07(a)(l 1) that the instrument be capable of causing
death. 21' In this case, since a shank was specifically described as a home-
made stabbing device, it may qualify as a deadly weapon if it was specifically
adapted to cause serious bodily injury, even if it was never used. 2 12
3. Use of Grand Jury Testimony Under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence
804: Witness Unavailable
In Jones v. State2 13 a witness who testified at the grand jury asserted her
Fifth Amendment right at trial, so the defendant sought to introduce her
grand jury testimony under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 804(b)(1). 214
After noting that the assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege makes a wit-
ness "unavailable," 2 15 the court of criminal appeals held that grand jury tes-
timony fits within the hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(1) and was
admissible in this case. 216 The testimony met the rule's requirement that the
State have an "opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony.1 217
Some of the transcript of the testimony, however, was hearsay within hear-
say, because the witness had narrated statements that the defendant had
made to the witness, and therefore those parts were inadmissible under
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 805.218 Since the defendant offered all the
testimony without specifically offering only the admissible part, error was
waived. 2 19 Under established case law, "[w]hen evidence which is partially
admissible and partially inadmissible is excluded, a party may not complain
upon appeal unless the admissible evidence was specifically offered."' 220
206. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(l 1)(B) (Vernon 1974).
207. Utility knives, straight razors, and eating utensils could qualify as deadly weapons





212. Id. at 620-21.
213. No. 69,894 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 23, 1992).
214. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 804(b)(1) (stating that if a witness is "unavailable" her testi-
mony given at certain types of prior hearings is admissible).
215. Jones, slip op. at 2.
216. Id. slip op at 4-5.
217. Id. at 3 (quoting TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 804(b)).
218. Id. at 5-6; TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 805 (precluding hearsay within hearsay unless each
part of the combined statement meets an exception to the hearsay rules).
219. Jones, slip op. at 6.
220. Id. (citing Schultz v. State, 446 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)).
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4. Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Suitability for Probation
Ortiz v. State221 began when the State, over objection, offered the testi-
mony of a psychiatrist who said that the defendant was not a good candidate
for probation. On appeal, the court of appeals relied on previous case law
from the court of criminal appeals and held that admission of this testimony
was error.222 The court of criminal appeals interpreted Texas Rule of Crimi-
nal Evidence 403223 and Rule 702224 and held that the admissibility of expert
testimony was a trial judge's decision that would be reversed on appeal only
for abuse of discretion.225 As long as there is a rational basis for a trial
judge's decision that under Rule 702 evidence will assist the jury, or will not
assist them, then appellate courts should not conduct a de novo review of the
trial judge's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony. 226 Therefore, a
battle of experts is acceptable if the trial judge wants to allow one.
E. PRESERVATION OF ERROR UNDER TEXAS RULE OF CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 104(b): THE "I'LL CONNECT IT UP LATER" RULE
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 104(b) states that when relevancy of a
piece of evidence (piece # 1) depends upon the admission of another piece or
other pieces of evidence (piece #2, etc.), the trial court shall admit it subject
to the admission of that other piece.227 In Fuller v. State228 the State was
proving up the existence of a prison club called the Aryan Brotherhood
(piece # 1) before it proved up that the defendant was a member (piece #2).
The State, however, never got around to proving piece #2, and the defend-
ant never objected to this at trial. On appeal, the court of criminal appeals
said that the party opposed to the introduction of evidence under Rule 104(b)
must object if piece #2 is never admitted, or that party's complaint is waived
as to the admission of piece # 1.229 This objection must be timely, which
presumably will be when the party proponent rests without proving up piece
#2.230
III. POSTTRIAL AND APPEAL AREAS
In these areas, the court of criminal appeals addressed the limits on juror
testimony about improper influences, the effect on appeal of the submission
of a partial statement of the facts, and the effect of a lawyer's uncontradicted
observations about a jury-panel during a Batson challenge. The court also
decided cases regarding who can authorize an appeal by the state and the
221. 834 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
222. Ortiz v. State, 781 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. granted).
223. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 403 (allowing the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).
224. Id. 702 (governing testimony by experts).
225. Ortiz, 834 S.W.2d at 348.
226. Id.
227. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 104(b).
228. 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).




time limits for giving notice of an appeal by the state. Additionally, the
court examined the defendant's right to choose a jury for setting punishment
on remand, the right to a punishment hearing when deferred adjudication
probation has been revoked, and the defendant's right to have his trial attor-
ney represent him on appeal.
A. PROVING JUROR MISCONDUCT AT A MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL HEARING
At a motion for a new trial hearing where a defendant is trying to show
jury misconduct by putting a juror on the stand, Texas Rule of Criminal
Evidence 606(b) provides that a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him ... except that a
juror may testify as to any matter relevant to the validity of the
verdict." 231
Interpreting this rule broadly, the court of criminal appeals held in Buentello
v. State232 that the rule addresses anything the trial court deems relevant. 233
"What is considered 'relevant' will be determined on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the court's experiences and observations, the grounds for
a new trial set forth in [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure] 30(b), and the
caselaw developed under the predecessor to 30(b)," article 40.03 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.2 34 There need not be any "overt act."' 235 In
Buentello, the jurors discussed the parole law and several of them voted for
the maximum of twenty years because they thought they had to keep the
defendant in prison for one to five real-time years. The court found that this
discussion involved a misstatement of the law, asserted to other jurors as
fact, that jurors relied on in casting their votes. 236 This finding required
reversal and remand. 237
B. PRESERVATION OF ERROR ON APPEAL
1. Preservation of Error in a Sufficiency Claim
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53(d) allows a partial statement of
facts to be submitted by the appealing party and creates a presumption on
231. TEX. R. CRIM. EviD. 606(b).
232. 826 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
233. Id. at 614.
234. Id. In particular, the court noted that the test in Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984), is a viable means of determining whether a jury's discussion of parole law
constitutes reversible error. Buentello, 826 S.W.2d at 614. According to the Buentello court,
Sneed held that Article 40.03 required that a defendant prove five factors to show reversible
error based on a discussion of parole by a jury: "(1) a misstatement of the law; (2) asserted as a
fact; (3) by one professing to know the law; (4) which is relied upon by other jurors; (5) who
for that reason changed their vote to a harsher punishment." Id. at 611 (citing Sneed, 670
S.W.2d at 266).
235. Buentello, 826 S.W.2d at 614.
236. Id. at 615-16.
237. Id. at 616.
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appeal that nothing omitted from the record is relevant to any of the points
raised. 238 Notice of which points will be raised must go to the other party,
who can add other parts of the statement of facts to the record. 239 In Green-
wood v. State24° the defendant challenged sufficiency and complied with the
rule. The court of criminal appeals said that Rule 53(d) was not meant to
apply to a sufficiency challenge because of the necessity in a sufficiency chal-
lenge that the entire record and statement of facts be reviewed "in a light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt."'24 1 This mandate is constitutional and under Texas Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 50(d), which places the burden on the party seeking review
to come forth with a sufficient record to show error, 24 2 the defendant must
order the entire record to challenge sufficiency. 243
2. Uncontradicted Observations by Counsel Are Presumed True Proof on
Appeal
In arguing that the trial court should grant his Batson motion, the defend-
ant's attorney in Emerson v. State244 mentioned his observations about the
panel on the record. He stated that four blacks on the panel were struck by
the prosecutor, one of them was not asked any questions, and the attorney
utilized a comparative analysis to show that two other panel members were
struck because of race. The court of appeals held that the "observations of
counsel offered in support of his motion to dismiss the array do not consti-
tute evidence" and dismissed defendant's Batson challenge. 245 The court of
criminal appeals held that such observations are evidence when made in the
presence of the prosecutor and judge and are neither contradicted nor ob-
jected to. 2 4 6 Thus, the observations were valid proof in support of appel-
lant's showing of a prima facie case of discrimination. 247 The court then
reversed the conviction by finding that a prima facie case was made and that
the judge did not convene a hearing to get neutral explanations. 248 This
case, of course, has broad ramifications concerning uncontradicted observa-
tions by counsel beyond Batson hearings, and was in no way limited to those
hearings.
238. TEX. R. App. P. 53(d).
239. Id.
240. 823 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
241. Id. at 661.
242. TEX. R. App. P. 50(d).
243. Greenwood, 823 S.W.2d at 661.
244. 820 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
245. Id. at 804 (quoting Emerson v. State, No. A14-80-00778-CR slip op. at 7 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] October 4, 1990)).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 804-05.
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C. STATE'S RIGHT TO APPEAL
1. Who Can Give Notice of Appeal? The Prosecuting Attorney (Pretty
Much)
Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, governing the
State's right to appeal, provides that the State, through the prosecuting at-
torney, may appeal criminal cases in certain situations. 24 9 The article then
defines prosecuting attorney, saying the term "does not include an assistant
prosecuting attorney. ' 250 The court of criminal appeals stated in State v.
Muller25' that this statute means what it says and that therefore an assistant
may not give notice of appeal for the State. 252 The prosecuting attorney
may, however, by a court-imposed modification of article 44.01 invented in
this opinion, personally authorize the filing of an appeal by an assistant.253
Therefore, within the fifteen day window the State is given to appeal, the
prosecuting attorney 254 must personally sign the notice of appeal or person-
ally and expressly authorize an assistant to file a specific notice of appeal on
his behalf.25 5 A standing authorization to an assistant would not meet this
test.256 Also, in State v. Boseman,257 an Assistant City Attorney gave notice
of appeal within the fifteen days but the specific authorization from the pros-
ecuting attorney was given after the fifteen days, and this was held to not
meet the test.258 One caveat should be noted: a prosecuting attorney who is
out of town should use a fax or telegram to authorize the assistant to give
notice of appeal. 259
2. Signature Stamp of the Prosecuting Attorney Not Enough
Following the reasoning in Muller above, the court of criminal appeals
held in State v. Shelton 26° that a signature stamp of the elected county attor-
ney, followed by the real signature of an assistant county attorney, was insuf-
ficient to invoke article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.261
Specifically, the State failed in its burden to prove that the appeal was per-
249. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01 (a-d) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The article does
not specifically provide that the prosecuting attorney may appeal, but rather states that "the
state" may appeal. Id. Article 44.01(d), however, specifically refers to the prosecuting attor-
ney in imposing the 15 day time period for filing. Id. Therefore, the state and prosecuting
attorney are interchangeable terms for the purpose of this article.
250. Id. art. 44.01(i) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
251. 829 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
252. Id. at 810.
253. Id.
254. Practically speaking, this means the elected D.A. or County Attorney. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(i).
255. Muller, 829 S.W.2d at 811-12.
256. See id. at 810 & n.6.
257. 830 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
258. Id. at 591 (citing State v. Muller, 829 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
259. See Muller, 829 S.W.2d at 812-13 n.9. The court noted that it would be possible for
the prosecutor to supplement the record with evidence that personal approval was given within
the time period. Id.
260. 830 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
261. Id. at 606.
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sonally, expressly, and specifically authorized by the prosecuting attorney. 262
3. When Does the Fifteen Day Time Limit for Giving Notice Begin
Under Article 44.01(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the
State has fifteen days from the date an appealable order is entered to give
notice of appeal. 263 The question in State v. Rosenbaum264 was whether the
order was entered when the judge granted it, or when the clerk entered it in
the minutes of the court, or at some other time. The court of criminal ap-
peals construed the term "entered" to mean the date on which the judge
signs the order. 265 By following the procedure outlined by the facts of this
case, however, the judge can "post date" the order. 266 Here, the judge
signed the order on June 28 but by letter to the clerk he "post dated" it to
July 2. Thus, the State had fifteen days from July 2, not June 28, to file
notice of appeal. 267
D. NEW TRIAL ON PUNISHMENT GETS YOU A NEW ELECTION ON
WHO DISHES IT OUT
In Saldana v. State268 the court held that if a case is reversed because of
error at the punishment phase, and, therefore, is sent back for reassessment
of punishment, or if a motion for new trial is granted for that purpose, then
the defendant elects anew whether a jury or the trial judge will set punish-
ment. 269 This is true even if the defendant waived the jury at the first trial or
plea.270 The court found that "the enactment of article 44.29(b) 27 1 created a
right to choose either jury or court assessment of punishment after such a
remand, notwithstanding [that] such choice [was made once already] at the
original trial."'272
E. RIGHT TO A PUNISHMENT HEARING WHEN DEFERRED
ADJUDICATION PROBATION Is REVOKED
When a defendant receives deferred adjudication probation under article
42.12, section 5 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,273 he has certain
rights when the State moves to revoke the probation and adjudicate him
guilty. The article states that he
262. Id.
263. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(d) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
264. 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
265. Id. at 402.
266. Id. at 403.
267. Id.
268. 826 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
269. Id. at 950-51.
270. Id.
271. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Article 44.29(b)
states in pertinent part that "[i]f the defendant elects, the court shall empanel a jury for the
sentencing stage of the trial in the same manner as a jury is empaneled by the court for other
trials before the court."
272. Saldana, 826 S.W.2d at 950.
273. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 5 (Vernon 1991).
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is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of
whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge.
No appeal may be taken from this determination. After an adjudication
of guilt, all proceedings... continue as if the adjudication of guilt had
not been deferred.274
In Issa v. State27 5 the court of criminal appeals construed this last empha-
sized portion to require that the trial judge, after an adjudication of guilt,
hold a punishment hearing and afford the defendant, and presumably the
State, an opportunity to present evidence. 276
F. RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY: MUST BE TRIAL ATTORNEY IF
DEFENDANT WISHES
In Buntion v. Harmon,277 a mandamus action, the Relator sought to com-
pel the Respondent, the trial judge, to appoint the trial attorney for the ap-
peal. Both the defendant and the trial attorney wanted the attorney to
represent the defendant on appeal, but the trial judge, because of policy rea-
sons that were in no way a reflection on the trial attorney, refused and
sought to appoint new and different counsel to do the appeal. In condition-
ally granting relief, the court of criminal appeals held that under the facts of
this case, the trial judge had to allow the trial counsel to continue on the
appeal. 278 The court reasoned:
Given the fundamental nature of an accused's right to counsel, we can-
not agree that a trial judge's discretion to replace appointed trial coun-
sel over the objection of both counsel and defendant extends to a
situation where the only justification for such replacement is the trial
judge's personal "feelings" and "preferences." There must be some
principled reason, apparent from the record, to justify a trial judge's sua
sponte replacement of appointed counsel under these circumstances. 2 79
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274. Id. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (emphasis added).
275. 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam) (original proceeding).
276. Id. at 161.
277. 827 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
278. Id. at 949.
279. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
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